TIVISM AND ABSOLUTISM IN MANN'S DEMYTHOLOGISING HERMENEUTIC
by PROFESSOR JOSEPH R UNZO the reliability of the kerygmatic tradition must not be questioned, for otherwise the eschatological event to which the kerygma testifies would be implicated in the relativity of all historical knowledge. 1 E VEN as RudolfBultmann's demythologising hermeneutic has irresistibly revolutionised biblical criticism, it has remained an uneasy alliance between historical criticism and philosophical insight, and an uneasy duality between the exigencies of historical relativism and the claims of the kerygma. An initial examination of Bultmann's demythologising program will expose a remarkable tension between the relativism of his philosophy of history and the absolutism of his Christian existentialism. I will then assess several prima facie contradictions which arise within Bultmann's thought from this relativist-absolutist tension. I will conclude with a suggested resolution of this tension between historical relativism and the absolutist claims within Bultmann's theology. For only by clarifying and dealing forthrightly with the serious conflicts within the demythologising hermeneutic can we retain the spirit of Bultmann's own admonition that in approaching the mythological elements of the biblical world-view, 'absolute clarity and ruthless honesty are essential both for the academic theologian and for the parish priest'.
I
Bultmann's demythologising hermeneutic evolved from his pastoral concerns. 'The real problem', he says in reply to Karl Jaspers' critique of demythologisation, 'is the problem of interpreting the Bible and the teachings of the Church in such a way 1 Rudolf Bultmann, 'A Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind The demythologising hermeneutic was pastoral concern as Bultmann, looking back conf~o?ted t~e acute 'problem of history' :4 relativity, rmsed by the historicity of human compounded by the strictures which histori ology places on any interpretation of the Bi document.
5 Let us define a 'world-view' as schema of all the cognitive elements which experience-viz. primarily concepts and interrelationships, the syntax and semantics logic. Bultmann holds that each person li lives within the world-view(s) of his or'her historian investigates the historical biblical perception of them is delimited by the co11ce:ot1 1 2 his world-view. 6 Yet the historian is which were created within the conceptual different world-view. For the cosmology of Bultmann says, is mythological (essentially b of Jewish apocalyptic and the Gnostic rec:len1ntion the modern person is a technological ....,.,.,,.ct.. is incautiously ambiguous in his use of 'demythoHe uses the locutions 'mythology' and, consequently, · · in two different ways. Sometimes he defines in terms of an imagistic way of using language, and as the attempt to eliminate that imagistic biblical documents in order to make the underlying meaning of those texts evident. In this usage, says that 'mythology is the use of imagery to express Idly in terms of this world and the divine in terms life', a and he refers to mythological language as '. 4 Besides this imagistic sense of 'mythology', also uses what we can refer to as the 'scientific sense'
In this sense, 'mythological thought regards the , ... as an interference with the course of nature, the life of the soul ... -a miracle, in fact'.
5 Bultmann can call this conception of the world mythological does not believe that the course of nature can ... by supernatural powers '. 6 whether 'mythology' is understood in the imagistic sense, and whether one concomitantly 'demytholBible by eliminating metaphorical talk about the by eliminating unscientific conceptions and explana- every statement of truth and of value will follow form of these two logical forms for sentences.
Thus, Bultmann's general relativist position sentential operator with two components for sentence. Those two components would be .... ·.r.-..,--_"" operator, 'it ~s ~r.ue', or a valuation operator (e.g. and the relatiVISing operator, 'on world-view W' isi~g operator' I mean an exclusionary · w~1ch contrasts one set of cognisers, such asy'"" 0 4 ·nL"e'"'','sJ.,~J.£l;Jl. A.c ~VIth all other. cognisers. The relativity of the judgments which the consistent application of valuation, and relativising operators entails is a relativity of correctness of judgments about matters value which constitutes relativism broadly rn,nr~~;-t,.,.e:~;
With 2 A person possesses a specific world,.. has been shaped principally by the historical forces place in history. That world-view delimits the and conceptions, arising out of one's -pi·e-1uncterstanctl!l which one will approach the biblical texts. Now, one might alter portions of one's worldfronted with sufficiently significant and persis which are not satisfactorily accounted for world-view. Yet we must always use, and so our current world-view in order to assess and ., . . . . . . ,..,. . . . . "'""' elements for that world-view. One cannot, world-views in toto the way one trades suits ofclO•tnJes~~, 1 In order to prevent logical contradi~tions, there will neces~uiJ'~; which will be excepted from the strictures of these relativising e.g. the law of non-contradiction. For if one's world-view is formed within, and thus by, the modern scientific world-view(s), that very fact --'--·~""",·,ne, in part, the epistemic starting-point of historical into the Bible. One cannot simply eliminate one's own ·ew and replace it with some composite of the worldof the early church. To reject the demythologising tic totally is effectually either to deny the relativist gy which the historicity of human experience seems upon us, or to deny that there is any literal sense in of the mythological elements of the Bible. Conversely, to a demythologising hermeneutic is, and is no more than, ·ust to hold that the message of scripture and the church to any specific, historically determined world-view; say (following Matt. 28. I g) that the kerygma is for 'all , whatever their place in history. 2 For the character, and hence the 1 'c 1 en.tlt'Vl\ particular historical 'event' is ir: part determined by ceptual structure of the world-view of the inquirer. matter, the conceptual structure of the inquirer's even determines the criteria-e.g. duration, rela parts, etc.-for what counts as an 'event'.) As example, and one which Bultmann would readily only be a historical 'fact' for oneself that Jesus was an:
if one believes that exorcism is possible.
Likewise, and in the second place, if we can of historical inquiry only in terms of the worldinquirer, then in some instances a chronological historical events may not even be within the ,......, .,..,.,. that it is meaningless to hold t at t e nstmn hich is a historical phenomenon, is absolute in the w essing the 'highest rank' and being of 'irreplaceable human culture'. Yet Bultmann subsequently asserts uteness of the Christian faith with respect to the which it demands of the believer.
2 This absolutist tes a contradiction within Bultmann's own thought. while recognising historical relativity, Bul~mann m~kes · t claim because he wants to avmd a radical ;Ui:J\.n..,..
•-~~ which he feels would deny the compelling claims of . Now certain kinds of absolutist claims are comwith a relativist epistemology of the sort which Bultmann in generaL In this regard, it will be helpful to disfollowing the work of Rudolf Carnap, between two questions of existence vis-a-vis world-views. 'Internal ' are those questions which concern the existence of given the logical structure of a specified world-view.
questions' are questions regarding the existenc~ of specified world-view in itself. 3 Most non-meta-logical of truth and value (including the presuppositions of inquiry) are internal questions, which presuppose the structure of the relevant world-view. On a relativist •'YY'Ir>~nnru, the truth or falsity, and the logical or empirical or contradiction, of answers to these internal questions and value are relative to, and dependent on, the logical of the world-view in question. So within a relativist , internal absolutist claims are perfectly sensible and coherent in so far as they are regarded as within the world-view which they presuppose-. """"-''"UI;t=' But Bultmann's absolutist claims are not mad absolutist claims, and consequently his e contradictory. For the difficulty with Bultmann'
claim.s about the Chdsti~n faith is that they · 8 questwns, yet they are, ultimately, cast in unres:tri,cted terms. Thus, Bultmann treats certain absolutist the kerygma as logically prior to and as en<~on 1 r general, and otherwise consistent, relativity ofhis history.
IV
Bultmann's insistence on the inviolateness of the, tradition-so that the eschatological event to which it not 'implicated' in historical relativity-rests on absolutist claims. Bultmann holds that the kerygma, or of the Christian faith, is absolute. this claim is founded on as well as foundational for hermeneutical circle here) the further claim that ism's, and particularly Martin Heidegger's, und human existence is correct, absolutely. Bultmann to hold that 'to speak of faith in the living God presence in Christ is pure myth unless these things existentialist interpretation' .1
In assessing the contradiction which these absol engender within Bultmann's thought, it should first Conclusion from 3 and 5 ly, premise (I) is a critical premise here. It is necessary subordinate conclusion in line (3), and it is thereby both for the second subordinate conclusion, (5), and principal conclusion, (6), of the argument. But (I) is a statement of the Existentialist position (re-expressed . Thus, Bultmann commits the fallacy of petitio principii pposing this Existentialist position as part of his argument adequacy of that same Existentialist analysis for biblical is not surprising, however, since Bultmann himself that every interpretation necessarily involves some uppo:sitions, and thus necessarily involves some world-view.
Regarding his own view of biblical exegesis, he says that I think I may take for granted that the right question frame with regard to the Bible-at any rate within Church-is the question of human existence. I am to that by the urge to inquire existentially about my existence. 1 But this is simply an expression of Bultmann's own world · The fact that Bultmann himself feels compelled to use Existentialist position in his biblical exegesis obviously does entail the necessity of using that philosophical position as every foundational world-view for any biblical exegesis.
Turn now to this more damaging problem: Bultmann tradicts his own basic philosophy of history, and its epistemology, by arguing from the espousal and u~ .......... UJLv.:>.:~ himself of this Existentialist analysis, to the suggestion that world-view which does not use such an Existentialist can only produce a mythological interpretation of the The danger and inevitability of a mythological inrpy·n . . . . . .,t-..,+-.;~~·· the Bible if one uses a different world-view may appear from within Bultmann's own Existentialist world-view. Yet the same conclusion follow from the world-view of every biblical exegete? Empirically, this question must o · answered negatively. But the crucial issue here is a logical not an empirical one. Bultmann unqualifiedly accepts Existentialist analysis as a foundation for biblical exegesis, insists on the absolute truth of the ( demythologised) These positions are logically inconsistent with the epistemology which he employs in claiming that, in other matters of truth and value are governed by sentential operators. However laudable, Bultmann's insulate the kerygma against relativity is purely ad hoc on has proposed his relativistic epistemology in recognition. historical relativity.
It is one thing for Bultmann to say that the purpose demythologising hermeneutic is to interpret, not elimina mythological elements of the Bible and so to make the faith clearer to modern people~2 Some 1nethodological cc:nflict which arises in Bultmann's thought relativist Impetus for demythologising and his own to Existentialist principles derives in part I Bultmann's conception of 'the modern scientific H'"'·' ....... a. relatively monolithic phenomenon. Bultmann dichotomy between 'the' mythological-ancient ur.-..... ,~. ~c 'the' s~ier:tific-modern world-view. Starting from to~y: It Is easy to suppose that, if focusing on pnnCiples and the search for the meaning of human helps many modern people to understand the Bible will help all modern people since they all share th~ scientific world-view. However, recent philosophy of science indicate that it is not correct to scientific world-view.
Thomas Kuhn has argued persuasively in The Scientific Revolutions that throughout history, advanced by means of successive changes in the 'paradigms' of the community of scientists. Kuhn science does not consist of the slow accretion of facts but of radical and revolutionising shifts of Regarding such scientific revolutions, he says that: when the normal-scientific tradition changes, the perception of his environment must be re··ectucat<::CI some familiar situations he must learn to see a new After he has done so the world of his research here and there, incommensurable with the one inhabited before. . . . [This is a] reason why guided by paradigms are always at cross-purposes.
Science has, then, evolved in such a manner that world-views are incompatible with earlier views. 2 Consequently, within the complexities of century, there is no single scier1tific world-view. is a set of incompatible worlq-views, some held by But further, the semantic meaningfulness of the for oneself depends on the conceptual structure of one's world-view. Therefore given Bultmann's the historical rel~tivi.ty of world-views, the possibility ceptance, or of reJeCtiOn, of the kerygmatic proclama depend on, and vary with, one's world-view. (And literally, for some people the proclamation will ha any further enrichment of their world-view-no sigonitic because it will be semantically meaningless.) So the Christian faith too is caught in the relativity historicity. It is futile for Bultmann to enjoin 'those the modern world-view [to] live'-with respect to faith-'as though they had none' .
2 But then, how can cile the absolutist claims of the kerygma with relativity? VII 'Objective, critical reflectiqn' will not, as Bultmann provide a set of objectively 'correct' hermeneutical exegesis. 1 We have seen that Bultmann himself fails .......... ~·-h-e must fail-in presupposing his own Existentialist in his search for the 'correct' hermeneutical prinWe must assume some world-view in biblical exegesis to be consistent, we must acknowledge the relativity of that world-view even as we confront the Christian tion. Thus in order to avoid self-contradiction, 'sown general relativistic philosophy of history would him to hold concomitantly that (a) the philosophic 'tions which one holds in one's biblical exegesis are to the same relativity which governs the assumption of world-view, and that (b) response to the Christian faith is delimited by one's world-view. Yet here biblical exegesis the Christian faith are no different from science or history, any other human e_n~eavor or ~aith: _we can never sever from the relativity of our histonCity. And, moreover, ...... --~·~ . . . . . 's fundamental intentions are in fact compatible with more radical relativity of (a) and (b) which he denies but actually foHows from his own relativistic philosophy of holds that it is 'only by faith that God is enas Person', 2 that this faith-encounter comes the kerygmatic proclamation. For Christ, Bultmann , 'meets us in the word of preaching and nowhere else '. 3 first, that proclamation can only come to us in human , using human concepts with all their historical and relativity. And second, relativity will also condition s response to that proclamation. In short, the very possiofresponse to the proclamation rests on internal questions rvo1v'mv one's own historically relativised world-view. Yet tible with the pastoral motivation for Bultmann's .emlvtllol,oglSinlg hermeneutiC-where the task is to discover how ew Testament can be meaningful, and the kerygma tic claims otnoellm~r.for modern people. And this is also compatible with insistence that 'it is only when there is no ... objective that faith acquires meaning and strength'. Furthermore, within this more consistent Bultmann's relativistic epistemology, it will still be hold that the demythologised kerygmatic absolute. But it is only absolute in its demand for those who, within the strictures of their own world understand the demand and are able to respond. only sense in which 'wherever a revealed faith asserts, and must assert, the absoluteness of its More precisely, this relativising of the absoluteness of faith has the logical form:
It is true (or valuable) ... on world-view W . .. demand to decision of the Christian faith is absolute.
And this logical form provides a model for rec:on~ciliJ central relativist and absolutist elements ofBultmann's For, relative to the world-views of those who could consistent application of the strictures of this logical account both for the absolute claims of the kerygma relativist epistemology like Bultmann's which human relativity. The demands of the faith will accounted absolute. But as William] ames would have proclamation is absolute, but only absolute for those it is a 'live option'. 2 Yet at the same time, to the extent that discourse within the logical (or linguistic) bounds of those ................ ~ .. which the demand to decision of the Christian faith is the relativising sentential operators of a relativist like Bultmann's need only function implicitly. The sentential operators of a relativist epistemology import from the comparison of one world-view with from the examination of a single idea from the point different world-views. Hence, whenever both the the hearers possess world-views on which respohs demand to decision of the Christian faith is possible, statements about the demand to decision will not relativist epistemology-as long as relativising operators implicitly govern t4ose statements. 
